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Abstract: This paper presents a novel incentive-based load shedding management scheme within a
microgrid environment equipped with the required IoT infrastructure. The proposed mechanism
works on the principles of reverse combinatorial auction. We consider a region of multiple consumers
who are willing to curtail their load in the peak hours in order to gain some incentives later. Using
the properties of combinatorial auctions, the participants can bid in packages or combinations in
order to maximize their and overall social welfare of the system. The winner determination problem
of the proposed combinatorial auction, determined using particle swarm optimization algorithm and
hybrid genetic algorithm, is also presented in this paper. The performance evaluation and stability
test of the proposed scheme are simulated using MATLAB and presented in this paper. The results
indicate that combinatorial auctions are an excellent choice for load shedding management where a
maximum of 50 users participate.
Keywords: combinatorial auction; energy efficiency; evolutionary algorithms; load shedding;
microgrid; smart grid; IoT
1. Introduction
With the ever increasing population and growing industrial sector in the developing
countries, providing a reliable energy service can be very difficult. With a wide gap in the
supply capacity and the demand on the grid, a lot of investment is needed to improve the
gird’s capacity to fulfil the demand of its users [1]. To solve this issue, a lot of efforts are
now being made to replace the macrogrids with microgrids [2]. However, the major source
of electricity generation for microgrids has been the renewable energy system, which often,
is unable to fulfil the grid’s electrical demand. In such a scenario, a microgrid can have
two possible solutions, (a) it can trade electricity from the other microgrids or the main
grid or (b) it can curtail the energy released to its users to match supply capacity [2,3].
In this paper, we address the issue of load (or energy) curtailment or load shedding in a
microgrid setting.
Previously, some work has been done to manage load shedding. For a fair load
shedding, smart meters can be used to learn the patterns of energy consumption in house-
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holds [1]. Additionally, the demand response of the households for load shedding can be
modelled using two major approaches: (a) incentive based and (b) price based. Incentive
based models are considered better in performance [3]; in such models the users curtail
their loads for a pre-determined tariff [3]. Incentive based models have been proposed
previously. Lee et al. gave an idea of using load curtailment as virtual generation, where a
demand response service provider bade with the generators while giving load reduction
instead of actual generation as the product [4]. Chai et al. used the principle of giving
incentives to the customers in order to shift their load from the peak prices and in turn
maximize the profit of the retailer [4].
However, the aforementioned work leaves significant scope for improvement. For
example, no platform exists that selects the customers if several of them are willing to
curtail load at the same time. This can allow to maximize the payment of load curtailment
paid to different users as well as the profit for the grid operator. Moreover, all the previous
works offer fixed incentives to all the customers instead of offering the incentives on merit.
Furthermore, most of the works did not consider that a user can behave dynamically at
different time periods, that is, the user’s willingness to curtail the load or afford a different
price can change from time to time. In this paper, we propose an auction mechanism
whereby the users can bid for energy curtailment. Therefore, below, we describe the
precedent of using auction mechanisms in different scenarios in the power sector.
Since the arrival of smart grid and the concept of smart cities, a lot has changed
on the technology front [5–8]. A lot of work has been carried out for the architecture of
IoT for smart grids to collect the information, thus enabling a lot of different fields [9].
In [10,11], a three-layer structure containing device layer, application layer and network
layer is discussed. Device layer (or the perception layer ) utilizes several kinds of different
sensor tags and readers or sensor equipment to collect information. In [12], four layers are
proposed: application layer, device layer, cloud management layer, and network layer. The
device layer is further divided into two sub-layers: the first one being the thing layer to
sense environment, control home appliances, and collect data and the second one being the
gateway layer which controls how to establish a connection to the elements of thing layer.
These advancements have helped in collecting and processing data from smart and micro
grids for applications of energy trading and load management.
IoT devices have been introduced in homes and buildings in recent years in order to
collect data on the building and its surroundings. These IoT devices can be used to collect
several types of information and can be deployed on the installations (air handling unit
(AHU), lift, chiller, etc.) to extract data such as temperature and vibration [13,14]. For the
microgrid infrastructure, many communication protocols can be adopted. However, by
applying different private protocols will result in poor interoperability and higher develop-
ment costs. An alternative is the Internet of Things (IoT), an infrastructure of interconnected
devices and systems, together with information resources and intelligent services. By us-
ing IoT to interconnect the devices within the microgrid, the system will become more
intelligent and efficient. Moreover, the microgrid and energy management systems of the
customers would no longer be stand-alone entities but part of a ubiquitous network.
Recently, a lot of efforts have been made on energy trading and its various applications.
Energy trading has previously been done successfully for energy storage sharing and
load sharing [15,16]. Trading methods for energy can be classified into two different
categories, that is, the auction based approach and the game theoretic approach [16].
Auction mechanism is seen as a corner stone of the energy trading applications [7]. In this
study, we have used auction mechanism as a platform to select participants in the load
curtailment activity in order for them to gain some incentives in return. The main purpose
of an energy auction is to find the lowest cost relation between demand and supply, and
increase the overall social welfare, that is, the percentage sum of consumers’ surplus and
producers’ surplus [17]. Competition in an energy auction motivates the users to go for
energy saving devices and techniques such as demand response. However, most of the
deployed auctions ignore the fact the at times bidders want to bid in compound ways,
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that is, they want to submit and win multiple bids at a time, in order to maximize their
revenues. This problem is known as the exposure problem. A problem is defined as an
exposure problem, when the will of the user is to win multiple unit of an item or wants
to win several different items but end up winning too few [18]. According to different
economist, exposure problem should be avoided in order to increase the efficiency of the
auction process and increase the total revenue [18].
A Combinatorial auctions (CA) are touted as the best possible solution for the ex-
posure problem. Using the properties of combinatorial auctions, bidders can place bids
on individual items as well as combination of items present in the auction in form of
packages [19]. The feature of package bidding helps combinatorial auctions in solving the
exposure problem [20–22].
Despite their extensive use to solve the exposure problem, the combinatorial auctions
have only sparingly been used in the field of energy trading that also faces the exposure
problem. Penna et al. introduced the combinatorial auctions in electricity market and
used them for seasonal electricity tariff [23]. Zaidi et al. used combinatorial auctions
for multiple microgrid trading [2]. These auctions have also been used for allocation of
common energy storage sharing and shared facility control application [5,15,16,23]. In this
research, a reverse combinatorial auction has been used. An auction is said to be a reverse
auction when it has multiple sellers and one buyer only. In our case, we have multiple
sellers (the users willing to curtail electricity) and a single buyer (microgird). Each seller
sells its load reduction for a price incentive. Using reverse combinatorial auction, the users
can express their willingness in complex combinations in order to maximize their profits.
The winner determination problem of these auctions is defined to be as NP-Hard [2].
Historically, combinatorial auctions have been successfully been solved using Evalutionary
algorithms (EA). EA’s ability to simultaneously exploit a number of solutions in a search
space makes it a promising solution for solving various dynamic problems.
In this study, we use a hybrid algorithm that combines a genetic algorithm (GA) with
Binary Particle Swarm Optimization (BPSO) to solve the winner determination problems
(WDP) for the proposed reverse combinatorial auction. The Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion is the main inspiration for Genetic Algorithms [24], which in turn define a class of
evolutionary algorithms [17,25,26]. These Genetic Algorithms use techniques inspired by
evolutionary biology such as mutation, inheritance, crossover and selection. Using social
behaviour model-closely related to the swarming theory- of insects, fishes and birds as the
main inspiration, Kennedy et al. proposed Partical Swarm Optimization, more commonly
known as PSO [27,28]. Authors of [28], while comparing GA and PSO, concluded that
the computational cost of both the algorithms is mainly problem dependent [29] gave a
comparison of GA and PSO for solving unconstrained and constrained non-linear prob-
lems. The authors concluded that PSO works better in former problem type whereas,
GA outperform PSO when exposed to the later problem types, However, studies have
showed that despite some strengths and shortcomings or of both of the algorithms, hy-
bridization yields better results for many problems in comparison to the standalone GA
or PSO [27,28,30]; hybridization of metaheuristics is indeed common across a variety of
evolutionary algorithms [31].
Both these methods have been extensively used for solving combinatorial auctions’
WDP. A Genetic algorithm based determination problem (WDP) is introduced in [32]. The
bidders are only allowed to generate bid and offers in the XOR bid format because the
use of OR and AND bid formats entails extra complexities and increases computational
time. The PSO method is used in [33] for solving the WDP, but this produced suboptimal
results. WDP in CA is similar to 0-1 knapsack problem and can be optimized using the
algorithms used for solving Multi-dimensional Knapsack Problem [34]. In the past, hybrid
meta heuristics have heavily been used to solve knapsack problem, in order to achieve
optimality at a quicker rate [33–35].
The key contributions of this paper are:
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• Idea of setting up a separate market for load curtailment within a microgrid environ-
ment with suitable IoT infrastructure.
• The idea of giving different incentives to various different users according to their
bids for energy curtailment rather than fixed incentives for all.
• An auction mechanism for users to compete for load curtailment in a microgrid based
on combinatorial auctions
• A winner determination solution for single sided reverse combinatorial auction for
energy trading applications (one buyer multiple sellers).
This work is an extension of [2] where Zaidi et al. introduced combinatorial auction
based multiple microgrid trading mechanism to enable trading in between microgrids,
having IoT infrastructure. However, this paper focuses on how microgrids can manage
their electricity need during peak hours, if they are not able to buy any electricity from
other microgrids.
The paper organization is as follows: System model is presented in Section 2; Section 3
presents the overall auction process along with the winner determination process; a detailed
simulation study is explained in Section 4; and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. System Model
Consider a microgrid consisting of n number of consumers such that i = 1, 2, 3 . . . , n.
Each consumer is supposedly equipped with a load forecast system and energy storage
system. Moreover, each day is divided into m time intervals such that j = 1, 2, 3 . . . , m.
Each consumer Ci expects to consume Coij amount of energy at time interval j; however, at
the same time it expects to reserve Dij amount of energy for energy curtailment, that is,
it should be ready to curtail Dij energy whenever the grid needs. A microgrid manager
(MGM) is connected with the consumers and is also equipped with the load and generation
forecast system. When for time interval j, MGM predicts the shortfall of energy, it requests
the auctioneer to start the auction for load curtailment. The auctioneer then sends the
auction start notification to the consumers. MGC has a maximum reservation price Pj.
Similarly, each consumer also has a minimum desirable incentive they are expecting for
load curtailment.
Figure 1 shows the overall system model. The overall system is divided into three
entities—buyer, sellers and auctioneer. In the proposed mechanism, MGM is the buyer,
consumers are the sellers, whereas the auctioneer is a third party, who is responsible for
gathering the bids from different entities, processing the winning bids and calculating the
price of each trade. Provided with the load profile of the overall system and at the end
based on combinatorial auctions a load curtailment market is set up.
Figure 1. The system model for proposed mechanism.
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In this study, the energy management system, the auctioneer, and the microgrid man-
ager are all located within the same microgrid and are connected by either a wireless or
a wired network. For the wireless networks, lightweight IP stacks and the IPv6-based
communication protocol can be used to enable communication between the energy man-
agement systems of the customers and the auctioneer. For this purpose, 6LoWPAN [36,37]
can be applied to low-power devices with limited processing capabilities allowing them to
participate in the IoT infrastructure.
3. Overall Auction Process
3.1. Main Entities
The buyer, sellers and the auctioneer are the three main entities involved the auction
process. Users act as sellers as they are selling their capability to sell load curtailment, grid
becomes the buyer, which buys users ability to curtail load at a certain given incentive.
Whereas, auctioneer is the central figure which controls this trade between users and the
grid. Figure 2 shows the overall auction process. At the start of the auction, the auctioneer
collects the bids from the grid and users and arranges them in accordance to their order
design. After bids initialization, winners are selected using the WDP. The WDP of the
combinatorial auctions improves the overall social welfare. The buyer, sellers and the
auctioneer are the three main entities involved the auction process. At the start of the
auction, the auctioneer collects the bids from the buyer and sellers and arranges them in
accordance to their order design. After bid initialization, winners are selected using the
WDP. The WDP of the combinatorial auctions improves the overall social welfare.
Figure 2. Overall auction process.
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3.2. Structure of the Auctioneer
Figure 3 shows the overall structure of the auctioneer. The key components of auction-
eer are as follows:
a. Market Communication Manager: For Communication between auctioneer and bid-
ders. It collects the bids, informs the bidders about the results, communicates with
the matching module via order book and output manager.
b. New Bid Clock: Keeps an eye on new bids. If the timer runs out, the winners are
announced and round of auction is concluded. Refreshes to the initial stage, whenever
there is a new bid is received
c. New Winner Clock: Keeps a tab on new Winner. Refreshes whenever there is a new
winner (buyer and sellers selected for trade).
d. Matching Module: Runs the Winner Determination algorithm and selects the winners.
Looks for new winners until round of auction has ended. Gets the bids from market
logs and announce the results through output manager and communication manager.
e. Order Book: All the bids are collected in the order book and remains there until they
win or are expired.
f. Market Output Manager: Gets the results from the matching module and store them in
market log, while also giving the results to users via market communication manager
g. Market Log: Keeps the history of the market trades, all the winning and non-winning
bids which (valid and expired bids) via order book and output manager. Provides
historical data to the users and the grid.
Figure 3. Structure of the auctioneer.
3.3. Social Welfare
The percentage sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus is said be as the
social welfare [5]. This can be expressed as
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where, S.W. is the social welfare, Consur is consumer’s surplus, Prosur is the producer’s
surplus, Conwill ; in EUR; is the price the consumer is willing to pay, Prowill ; in EUR;is the
minimum price the producer is willing to get, and Willactual in EUR, is the trading price
determined by the auctioneer.
3.4. Bid Configurations for Submission
The idea of package bidding or combinations is used in the combinatorial auctions.
In package bidding, bidders are entitled to submit more than one bid, according to their
needs and optimal function, at any time [20–22]. In this study, users are permitted to bid in
order configuration using OR bids, XOR bids and atomic bids [20–22].
3.5. Winner Determination Process
Integer programming can be used to express the winner determination problem also
termed here as utility or fitness function. In this study, solving the winner determination
problem means maximizing the overall load reduction for the MGM along as well as the




























Hi = Di.ai (7)
TPi,j ≥ RPi,j (8)
where, Hi,j, measured in KW represents all the accepted load reductions, Di is the load
reduction bade by the individual customer I, whereas ai shows whether the bid is accepted
or rejected; ai can be either 1 or 0. If any part of the bid is accepted, the value of ai becomes
1. Pj, in EUR is the grid (buyer)’s maximum reservation price for all hours of the day,
whereas, TPi,j, in EUR, is the incentive price allotted to customer i at time j. Sh is the
maximum value of curtailment in KW, needed at time j. Furthermore, RPi,j, in EUR is the
minimum reservation price of the users (sellers).
The winner determination problem (WDP) of combinatorial auctions is considered to
be NP-Hard problem. Furthermore, it is similar to the 0–1 knapsack problem (KP) [38,39].
A KP problem occurs when resource allocation must obey different constraints. Initially,
single-unit winner determination problem was equated to weighted set packing prob-
lem [34]. However, authors of [39] discussed a relationship between winner determination
and knapsack problems [39]. Since, KPs—which are intensively studied in the past—are
relatively easy to understand; solving CA as 0–1 KP has been a common practice, To
solve the 0–1 KPs, the use of meta-heuristics has been frequent [40]. As combinatorial
problems require larger search space as compared to other optimization problems; thus,
Meta-heuristics such as EAs have been seen as an ideal solution.. Additionally, EA’s ability
to simultaneously exploit a number of solutions in a search space makes it a promising
solution for solving various dynamic problems. It is well known that the research on
WDP algorithms has profited from the algorithms used for Multi-Dimensional KP [34,39].
Many of previous studies have considered EA for winner determination of combinatorial
auctions by mapping the WDP as KP [29,32]. However, these works have their limitations
as well; for example, the time taken to find the optimal solution is large, or the optimal
solution is not found at all. This is because in combinatorial auctions, each and every com-
bination possible is checked similar to the KP; this produces a large search space. Hybrid
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Meta-heuristics are able to find the optimal solution for such problems and effectively solve
the WDP of combinatorial auctions [2,32]. In this study, we use a hybrid algorithm that
combines a genetic algorithm (GA) with Binary Particle Swarm Optimization (BPSO) to
solve the winner determination problems for the proposed reverse combinatorial auction.
In the past, hybrid meta heuristics have heavily been used to solve knapsack problem, in
order to achieve optimality at a quicker rate [33–35].
3.6. Proposed Algorithms
The BPSO algorithm is an iterative method that we leverage to optimise the objec-
tive function defined in Equation (4) subject to Equations (5)–(7). BPSO starts by ran-
domly generating a swarm of particles, where each particle is a binary string as shown
in Figures 4 and 5. A signle particle is depicted in Figure 4. Particles indicate a suggested
solution in terms of accepted and rejected bids, as shown in Figure 5, where bid acceptance
is represented using 1 and 0 shows a rejected bid. While generating the swarm, OR and
XOR bids have the most priority, while the atomic bids have the least priority. In BPSO,
each particle has a position vector and a velocity vector. A particle’s position encodes a
candidate solution to the problem at hand (a combination of bids in our case). Since the
current position (or the solution) is not necessarily optimal, the PSO iteratively changes
the position of each particle such that the average quality of the solutions in the swarm
improves. The velocity of each particle represents the magnitude and the direction of
change in its position in the next iteration.
Figure 4. Population Type.
Figure 5. Bid selection structure in Binary form.
Initially, as stated earlier, each particle k is assigned a random position zk and a
random velocity vk [2]. Each particle’s fitness value (that is the quality of the solution
that it represents) is calculated using the objective function defined in Equation (4) subject
to Equations (5)–(8); as the fitness values are evaluated for each particle, the personal
best position found for each particle and the global best position for the entire swarm are
updated. The personal best position indicates the best fitness value of each particle (so far
given the changes in its position), whereas the global best position indicates the best fitness
value amongst all the particles. This process is run until the saturation point is reached.
A saturation point is defined as the stage after which there is no change in the global or
personal best positions. The particles with the lower fitness values are discarded and the
global best solution along with other fit particles are taken to the next step.
After the above process, a group of particles with the highest fitness values, that is,
the elite particle group, is further refined via a Genetic Algorithm (GA). Following the GA
terminology, each particle’s position vector is now called a chromosome. Instead of using
velocity vectors to manipulate these chromosomes, these chromosomes are now manip-
ulated via the artificial genetic operators (Appendix B), that is, mutation and crossover
to form new chromosomes [5]. As earlier in the PSO, the fitness of each chromosome
resulting from the artificial genetic operators is calculated using the winner determination
objective defined in Equation (4) subject to Equations (5)–(8). The process is repeated
until the saturation point is reached. The final successful bid matches are represented by
the chromosome with the best fitness value. The overall winner determination process is
shown by Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: Hybrid GA and BPSO For Combinatorial Auction (AUCGENPSO)







Calculate particle’s position and velocity
Calculate Fitness Function using Equation (4)
Until saturation is reached
# Genetic Algorithm
Select the set of fittest particles from PSO to initialise the GA population
Repeat
Perform reproduction using crossover and mutation
Calculate fitness function using Equation (4)




We assume that 50 households are connected in a microgrid environment. The users
are connected to the microgrid controller via an auctioneer. The microgrid is equipped
with a generation capacity of 350 KW to 400 KW. The households bid for the load reduction
for incentives at different times of the day using combinatorial auction mechanism. Profile
of households along with the price data was taken from [41,42]. MATLAB R2015a was
used to implement the proposed auction mechanism. Using a Matlab based bid generator,
combinatorial bids were generated for the simulation purpose [43]. The simulation results
are compared to the sequential double auction [44]. The load profiles, showing average
and maximum load of the participating users are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Load profiles of households.
Household 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Avg. Load (KW) 2.32 4.26 4.3 3.13 4.76 3.9 4.06 4.17 3.8 3.79 4.03 4.45 5.71 5.54 4.49
Max Load (KW) 3.72 4.57 5.81 4.61 6.25 5.73 5.35 5.2 5.29 4.94 5.182 5.76 6.82 6.21 5.42
Household 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Avg. Load 2.83 3.78 4.9 4.8 3.9 3.84 5.6 4.03 5.44 4.23 4.38 3.771 3.81 4.74 5.44
Max Load 3.96 4.51 5.67 5.72 4.94 4.81 6.3 4.97 6.31 5.09 5.21 4.67 4.89 5.64 6.23
4.2. Simulation Analysis
The simulations analyses conducted in this study are described next.
4.2.1. Average Load Profile
The overall load profile of the micro-grid is compared in two cases; (a) without any
load reduction and (b) with load reduction. As illustrated in Figure 6, the red line shows
the maximum generation capacity of the microgrid, so it is necessary for the load to stay
below this line. However, the original load profile peaks at around 20 and 42 h, which in
turn requires load shedding. However, after the load reduction, these peaks stay under the
maximum generation capacity and the load is successfully shifted at other times, that is,
between 10 and 15 h and 25 and 40 h. Moreover, in the load profile after load reduction, the
overall load stays below the maximum generation time for the entire time, thus eliminating
the load-shedding scenario at all times.
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Figure 6. Average load profile before and after load reduction is presented.
4.2.2. Load Reduction
In this subsection, we compared the load reduction done using combinatorial auctions
and Sequential Double Auction. As illustrated in Figure 7 , the amount of load reduction
increases as the number of users increases. Furthermore, the load reduction with respect
to the number of users is better for combinatorial auctions than for sequential auctions
(Appendix A) for up to 65 users. However, the load reduction through combinatorial
auctions got saturated around 75 users, highlighting its limitation for larger number of
users. Whereas, load reduction through sequential auctions maintained an increasing trend.
Figure 7. Overall load reduction.
4.2.3. Average Incentives
In this subsection, we compared the average incentives per unit for combinatorial and
sequential double auctions. As shown in Figure 8, as the number of users are increased, the
amount of incentive per KWh is decreased because of the increase in number of winners.
Moreover, the results of combinatorial auctions are better than the sequential auctions.
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Though, the combinatorial auctions saturate around 55 user but have a better results than
sequential auction for up to 75 users. This concludes that for a region where number of
users are less than 75, combinatorial auctions are good choice and vice versa.
Figure 8. Average incentive per KW reduction.
4.2.4. Social Welfare
In this subsection, we have compared the social welfare, explained in Equations (1)–(3),
of the auction. In Figure 9, the social welfare of combinatorial auctions is compared to the
social welfare of the sequential double auction. For up to 65 users, at 1.25 (25%) the overall
social welfare is better for the combinatorial auctions than at 1.2 (20%) for the sequential
double auction case. Figure 9 shows the comparison of social welfare for different bid
types used in the combinatorial auctions, that is, OR, XOR and the atomic bids. The XOR
bids have the highest social welfare value of 1.27 whereas, OR has the maximum figure of
around 1.22. The atomic bids have a maximum social welfare value of up to 1.2. Moreover,
it was also noted that the overall social welfare value saturates around 45 to 50 number of
users for the combinatorial auction. Thus, making the proposed combinatorial auctions a
good choice for up to 50 users.
(a) (b)
Figure 9. (a) Social welfare comparison (b) social welfare comparison for different bid types in combinatorial auctions.
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4.2.5. Optimality Analysis of Proposed Algorithm
Under this heading, we compare our the proposed technique, with BPSO and GA,
with the number of generations and the fitness value or generally iterations as the main pa-
rameter for performance evaluation. An optimal solution, having low number of iterations
and high fitness value, was the desired outcome. While increasing the number of users
from 10 to 30, the number of generations required to obtain the optimal fitness value were
observed. A comparison between the proposed algorithm with GA and BPSO is depicted
in Figure 10. BPSO, while converging early for up to 30 users , has a lower fitness value as
compared to GA, which takes the highest time to converge However, AUCGENPSO clearly
outperforms GA as it converges early with a higher fitness value.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 10. Optimality results (a) no. of bidders = 10, (b) no. of bidders = 20, (c) number of bidders = 30.
5. Conclusions
Load shedding is a major issue especially with the ever growing power demand. With
the advancement in IoT technology, it is easier for the grids to ask users to curtail load at the
time of peak demand. In this paper, we focused on a scenario where in a microgrid environ-
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ment, the service provider hands out incentives to customers to curtail their load during the
peak hours. Problem from the service provider’s end was discussed in this paper and was
solved using auction mechanism to select the customers to participate in load curtailment
in order to gain some incentives. For better efficiency of the system, combinatorial auctions
were used. The proposed method was shown to be useful in a microgrid environment by
performing the performance evaluation of the overall auction process. Moreover, it was
noted that the social welfare improved as the number of participants increased.
This work can be further extended by adding non-financial incentives along with the
financial incentives. Furthermore, many different combinations such as AND can also be
included in the future studies. Finally, other machine learning algorithms [45] can also be
explored, compared and contrasted.
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Appendix A. Sequential Auctions
A scenario where multiple players share a common ES plant was established. Sequen-
tial auctions is organized at different time intervals t. Supplier submitted its supply bids
including the minimum price at which it is willing to trade and each player submitted
their demand bid, which includes the maximum price at which they can trade. Then,
by using supply and demand curves, the uniform clearing price and trading volume are
identified. Buyers who bid more than the maximum clearing price are allowed to buy
storage rights [41].
Appendix B. Genetic Operators
Appendix B.1. Crossover Mechanism
Crossover is a process to combine two or more solutions (or chromosomes as they are
called in the GA parlance) to create new solutions [24]. In this study, we have used the
uniform crossover mechanism. In the uniform crossover mechanism, corresponding genes
(bit positions) of two parent chromosomes are exchanged to form two new (or offspring)
chromosomes. Figure A1 exemplifies the crossover mechanism used in this study. In this
example, the offspring particles have half the information from each of the parent particles
arranged in a random manner.
Figure A1. CrossOver Mechanism.
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Appendix B.2. Mutation Mechanism
In mutation, one or more chromosome gene values are altered randomly [24]. Figure A2
shows the mutation mechanism used in this study. One chromosome representing bid
matches is changed to a new one using a bit-flip mutation (0 is flipped to 1). This forms a
new set of chromosomes and hence increases the variability of the population.
Figure A2. Mutation Mechanism.
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